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Abstract
The international non-governmental organization (INGO) 
community should develop their own system of accreditation for 
members. INGOs do not have a stable institutional position in 
the world order, and this hurts their capacity and 
effectiveness.
INGOs are organized parts of global civil society, and often 
act as agents of the public in the absence of any other 
organized presence. This representation is legitimate to 
some, reviled by others, and in no area universally accepted. 
In fact, the INGO community has an identity, wields power, and 
is subject to the same criticisms normally levelled at states. 
Yet the community has no legal personality.
The power INGOs wield lies in their ability to condition 
belief, not on capacity to punish or reward. As such, their 
role in the world order is limited to agenda-setting, trying 
to influence policy-making, helping implement actions, and 
monitoring decisions after the fact.
Accreditation builds legitimacy by establishing standards of 
management and behaviour. It could help institutionalize the 
INGO community into a predictable segment of the world order. 
Each segment of the world order would benefit from such an 
accreditation system. It would augment the 'legitimacy power' 
of individual INGOs, and further the interests of the INGO 
community as a whole. This would, in turn, improve the 
community's capacity to meet goals, while still allowing the 
community to determine its own identity.
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Glossary
1st Party certification. An assurance of internal compliance with 
standards set by an organization.
2nd Party certification. An assurance of compliance with standards
set through consensus by an industry's professional association.
3rd Party certification. An assurance of compliance with standards 
determined by an external consultant.
4th Party certification. An assurance of compliance with standards 
set by government or other authority.
certification. In terms of accreditation, these two terms mean the 
same thing: conformity with an external set of agreed upon 
standards, which has been audited by an external auditor
compliance. In terms of accreditation, the act of voluntarily
conforming to an external set of agreed upon standards, without 
being externally audited.
Global civil society. Groups and organizations, both formal and
informal, which act independently of the state and market to 
promote diverse interests in society.
Inglehartian political culture. A specific and structurally 
systematic way of sharing in political life.
mundane political culture. An inclusive way of sharing in political 
life.
INGO. International Non-governmental organization - a term referring 
one of a large variety of non-state, non-market organizations. 
They are generally understood to non-profit in motive and 
concerned with bringing citizens' concerns into international 
fora. These organizations address issues such as: world peace, 
human rights, pollution, and women's rights.
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Acronyms
APC. The Association for Progressive Computing (INGO).
CBIO. Central Bureau of International Organizations (INGO).
Cl. Conservation International (INGO).
COGG. Commission on Global Governance
ECOSOC. The United Nations Economic and Social Council.
FII. The Federation of International Institutions.
ICO. Independent citizen's organizations - a more accurate term for 
the group of organizations described as INGOs.
ICRC. International Committee for the Red Cross (INGO).
INCPO. The International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations 
is a frequently used structural/functional system of 
categorizing non-profit organizations.
INGO. International Non-governmental Organization.
INTKAC. International INGO Training and Research Centre.
MAI. Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
NSI. North-South Institute, a Canadian research organization in the 
field of international relations (INGO).
OECD. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
TNC. Transnational Corporation.
UIA. The Union of International Associations (INGO).
WTO. The World Trade Organization.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis will argue that, by creating and joining 
their own accredited association, the community of 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 
could help stabilize their role in the world order. This 
is a desirable goal for the INGO community because it 
would improve the ability of INGOs to accomplish their 
goals.
The problem of attempting to argue such a point is that 
the concepts associated with many of the terms used above 
are themselves ambiguous and controversial. Even if 
there was a common understanding of 'INGO', is there 
truly a 'community' of INGOs? If so, what would be 
implied by 'stabilizing' their role? Should INGOs be 
given any power to accomplish their goals? Would 
accreditation truly give INGOs more power?
This chapter establishes the framework for the thesis 
argument by addressing these ambiguities. The chapter 
establishes a conceptual framework by defining key terms. 
Then the chapter summarizes the questions addressed in 
subsequent chapters, and anticipates conclusions that 
will be drawn from the answers to these questions.
Context
At the end of the twentieth and in the first years of the 
twenty-first century, global affairs have become 
increasingly tied to the needs and desires of the
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individual. The general trends responsible for this re­
orientation have been:
• the proliferation of information and 
telecommunication^
• the spread of capitalism and democracy^
• globalisation and tribalism^
• theory-based interest in concepts of identity'^
The average global citizen today has much more knowledge 
of global affairs, and potential impact on global 
affairs, than at any earlier time in history.
The framework for the current system of global affairs, 
relevant to this thesis, was established in 1648. This 
period is important because the world was not considered 
in international terms until the emergence of states, and 
1648 is widely accepted, with the Treaty of Westphalia, 
as the most recognizable milestone for today's concept of
 ^Frederick, Howard. 1993. Global Communication and 
International Relations, Wadsworth Publishing. Belmont, 
CA. pp. 10-12.
 ^Little, Richard. 1995. "The Triumph of Capitalism". 
International Relations Theory Today, Pennsylvania State 
University Press. University Park, PA. pp. 62-89.
 ^Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld: How 
Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World, Random 
House. Toronto, ON.
 ^Anderson, Benedict. 1992. Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verson. New York, NY.
the geographically bound state^. This was the critical 
paradigm shift, as it institutionalized a means for 
political cultures to relate to one another in the world.
The establishment of this international system marked a 
historical starting point, and is used in this thesis to 
set the context for defining critical concepts. The six 
terms which are key to this thesis are reviewed and 
defined. These are; the "world order", "global civil 
society", "INGOs", "power", "legitimacy", and 
"accreditation".
Definition of Key Terms
The phrase "world order" refers to the complex structure 
of relations between actors in international affairs. It 
is simplified in this thesis to mean the relations 
between states, global civil society, and the market®.
® For discussions on the importance of the Treaty of 
Westphalia, see, for example: Zacher, Mark W. 1992.
"The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: 
Implications for International Order and Governance", J. 
Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds), Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics.
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. UK. p . 58. , and
Archer, Clive. 1992. International Organizations,
Routledge. New York, NY. pp. 4-5.
® This breakdown is used frequently in considering global 
affairs. For an example. See: World Bank 
PovertyNet.home 2001. "Civil Society and Social 
Capital". Website:
http :// W W W .worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/civill.htm
In this model, the state holds special status, because it 
is globally recognized as representing its citizens, and 
doing so under the authority of the rules prevailing in 
that particular geographic area. While some non-state 
actors pretend to work under the authority of the public, 
there are few actors outside the state that can claim to 
legitimately represent their stakeholders^.
The segment of the world order referred to by the term 
"global civil society" is determined in this thesis 
solely by contrast to the state and market segments. A 
detailed discussion of the reasons for this follows in 
chapter two, addressing the philosophical bases for the 
ambiguous uses of the term in academic literature. 
Generally, though, this thesis follows the simple concept 
of world order articulated by Harry Blair®.
Blair dissects the world order into state and non-state 
segments, and breaks down the non-state segment further, 
separating organizations with primarily private interests 
from those with public interests. The distinction
’ Cameron articulates this particularly well regarding the 
claims of INGOs that their inclusion in the Ottawa 
process made it more 'representative'. See:
Cameron, Max. 1999. "Global Civil Society and the 
Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti- 
Personnel Mines". Canadian Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 991
® Blair, Harry. 1997. "Donors, Démocratisation and Civil 
Society: Relating Theory to Practice". ". NGOs, States 
and Donors : Too Close for Comfort?, Ed. David Hulme and 
Michael Edwards, Save the Children Fund, New York, NY. 
p. 25 .
between the public and private segments is clearer when 
one considers organizations as groups of individuals 
involved in group decision-making. Where that group is 
motivated to generate benefit solely for the group (e.g. 
corporations, proprietorships), they are considered in 
this thesis to fall within the private segment. Where 
the group is motivated to produce benefits that are not 
specific to that group, they are considered in this 
thesis to be in the public segment (e.g. INGOs).
Figure 1 depicts the view of world order used in this 
thesis, with global civil society broken into organized 
and unorganized parts. The former is represented by 
"INGOs", the latter referred to by the term "the public"
INGOs
The
Figure Is A simplified view of the world order
The definition of this term, "INGOs", is controversial, 
involves a wide range of interpretations, and depends on 
the body of literature selected and the intent of the 
definer. These ambiguities are dealt with in detail in 
chapter two. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
organizations considered "INGOs" have the following 
minimal set of descriptive qualifications:
• They have goals, objectives and actions (in short, 
an ideology), independent of those of other people, 
organizations, or segments of the world order.
• They are not a part of the market segment of the 
world order. The goal of the organization is not to 
make profit beyond the costs of operations.
They are not a part of the state segment of the 
world order. The organization is not a state 
government, is not controlled by the state, and does
not have a mandate determined by the state.
• They deal with concerns which are of an
international nature.
• They frequently claim, or are perceived to be acting
on behalf of "the public".
Within global civil society, there are two relationships 
between the public and INGOs. These are relationships of
internal and external accountability^. First, INGOs are 
made of individuals who are citizen members of the 
public. As such, any given INGO has the purposes of a 
select group of the public as its guiding purpose; thus, 
an INGO's organizational structure must have a system of 
internal accountability to its members. Second, the INGO 
frequently functions as an agent of the public in the 
absence of any other representative.
It is the power relationships between different segments 
of the world order which are more useful in determining 
if accreditations will help or hinder INGOs. However, as 
the term "power" can itself be interpreted in a variety 
of ways, it is critically analysed in depth for this 
thesis.
Social scientist Max Weber offered a useful definition of 
the term "power". Simply put, power is "the possibility 
of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of other 
p e r s o n s . T h i s  definition was adopted by social 
scientist John Kenneth Galbraith for his seminal treatise 
on the nature of power^^. The usage is further confirmed
 ^ Kelleher, David. 1996. Grabbing the Tiger by the 
Tail: NGOs Learning for Organizational Change. Canadian 
Council for International Cooperation. Ottawa, ON. pp. 
4-8.
Weber, Max. 1954. Max Weber on Law in Economy and 
Society, Ed. M. Rheinstein. Transi. Edward ShiIs and M. 
Rheinstein. 1925. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 
MA. p. 323.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, 
Houghton-Mifflin. Boston, MA. p. 2 .
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by Kenneth Boulding^^, though he simplified it to: "the
ability to get what one wants" in the case of the 
individual, or the "the ability to achieve common ends" 
in the case of groups.
Both Boulding and Galbraith, the Quaker radical and the 
conservative economist respectively, analyse power by 
breaking it into three general categories. These 
categories are discussed in more detail in chapter three, 
and are contrasted with concepts of influence.
The difference between influence and power is determined 
by legitimacy. Where an individual or organization has 
power derived from an authority, they are said to have 
'legitimate power'. This is unlike influence, in that 
influence is seen as tactics to achieving an end, where 
power is seen as the ability to bring about an end^^. The 
challenge with locating the concept of 'legitimate power' 
in the world order is that it is anarchic by nature.
There is no authority to legitimate outside generally 
accepted standards, and these can themselves be 
influenced.
Boulding, Kenneth. 1989. Three Faces of Power, Sage 
Publications. Newbury Park, CA. p. 15.
13 Though work contrasting influence and power is still 
limited, a précis of current research is provided in: 
Yukl, Gary. 2 000. "Use Power Effectively". The
Blackwell Handbook of Principles of Organizational 
Behavior. Ed. Edwin Locke. Blackwell Publishers. Ma1den, 
USA. pp. 241-249.
These terms are all brought together to discuss the most 
important concept for this thesis: accreditation. Though 
the history and context of the term are analysed in 
detail in chapter four, those discussions can be 
simplified to accreditation being a means for 
establishing or enhancing legitimacy.
"Accreditation" is not a new concept; it is a common 
English language term. Simply defined, it is used to 
gain belief or influence for a group, attribute a thing 
to a person, or credit a person with a thing, or to 
guarantee quality^^. Broadly, this thesis is concerned 
with using accreditation as a verifiable means of 
ensuring the credibility of organizations.
As explained in chapter four, the accreditation of an 
organization is meant to refer to the systematic review 
of an organization's attributes against a set of prior- 
established standards^^.
14 1989. The Concise Oxford lüctionary. Oxford University 
Press. Toronto, Canada. pi 71
This mirrors the process used to assess conformity by 
ISO, the International Organization for Standardization. 
They use conformity assessments to check an organization 
against "documented agreements containing .. precise 
criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, 
or definitions of characteristics, to ensure that .. 
processes and services are fit for their purpose." 
Website :
http ://WWW.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.ht 
ml
with these definitions as context, the next three 
chapters will address: the nature of the INGO community; 
INGO legitimacy, influence and power; and how 
accreditation builds legitimacy. A brief summary of the 
topics covered in each chapter follows.
Chapter Reviews
Chapter two identifies the community of INGOs within the 
public segment of the world order. Their current 
position is precarious, relying as it does on the 
shifting support of the public or the state segment.
In the pursuit of what it means to 'stabilize the role of 
INGOs', chapter two asks what it means to be a part of 
global civil society: Where does the term "civil
society" come from, and what are the assumptions about 
its use? Who considers INGOs a part of civil society, 
and why? By whose authority do INGOS claim to be 
legitimate players in the world order? Are INGOs always 
perceived to be good, benevolent representatives of the 
public? Who determines the nature of an INGO? Is there 
a community of INGOs?
In fact, chapter two shows that the INGO does not have a 
legitimate role in the world order. An INGO community 
does exist, but the term 'INGO' is only descriptive, and 
does not currently have a broad enough meaning to be 
useful in distinguishing between organizations.
Chapter three addresses the actual roles INGOs play on a 
practical basis. It looks in further depth into concepts
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of power, and analyses INGO use of power in current 
settings. This chapter asks philosophical questions 
about the role of INGOs in the world order. Which 
segments of the world order consider which INGOs 
legitimate under which circumstances? What power do 
INGOs wield? How do INGOs wield their power? In what 
fora are INGOs effective at wielding power? What factors 
make an INGO legitimate?
In particular, concepts of power analysed in this chapter 
help identify the importance of 'legitimate power' in 
allowing INGOs to be effective in pursuing their goals. 
This 'legitimate power' is compared with 'condign', 
'compensatory', and 'conditioning' power, to specifically 
show how INGOs wield influence in the world order.
Chapter four shows that a process of accreditation 
augments legitimacy for members so accredited. After 
giving a brief review of the common historical context 
for accreditation, this chapter lays out the challenges 
of accreditation. In summary, would any form of 
accreditation be truly useful for the INGO community? 
Would the arena for discussion be any more valuable than 
currently existing systems? Would the legal personality 
thus created be beneficial to the work of INGOs? Could 
the power of INGOs be augmented with accreditation? What 
value would accreditation of INGOs hold for the public, 
the market, the state?
Whether beneficial or not, the establishment of a 
professional association is a challenge on its own. Is
11
the creation of such an association for INGOs truly 
feasible? Could INGOs agree on standards for 
accreditation? Do INGOs appear and disappear too quickly 
for an accreditation system to be worthwhile?
Reviewing literature on the development of credible 
accreditation practices shows that accreditation would 
create a legitimating process which would allow the INGO 
community to augment its legal personality in the world 
order.
Chapter five reviews the arguments presented, in terms of 
theoretical and practical issues. The practical 
obstacles to accreditation are significant, including: 
the lack of a current identity for the INGO community, 
and the difficulty in demonstrating the benefit of 
accreditation.
The main benefit, however, is shown to be even more 
significant: an accredited INGO community would have 
increased legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the 
market, and the states. This, in turn, implies that 
accreditation would enhance the legitimacy, and thus the 
'legitimate power' that allows INGOs to effectively 
pursue their varied goals.
At the same time, accreditation would address important 
criticisms the INGO community faces from organizations in 
every segment of the world order. Among these criticisms 
are: unwanted policy imposition, lack of accountability, 
ignorance of wider implications of their actions, the
12
disenfranchisement of stakeholders, and even the 
undermining of sovereignty.
These are key challenges to the INGO community; the 
ability to satisfy, or even ameliorate these perceptions 
would be important to all segments of the world order. 
Chapter two more thoroughly reviews each criticism, and 
places the INGO community more succinctly in its role as 
the organized agents within global civil society.
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Chapter 2 : INGOss Agents of Global Civil Society
In order to understand chapter three's discussion of the 
uses of INGO power, this chapter will look at the 
definitions of global civil society and INGOs.
Whether exalted or scorned, INGOs have played an 
increasingly noticeable role in the shaping of global 
issues. However, as there is no enduring, accepted 
definition for the term, the identity of an INGO depends 
on the person defining it, and the purpose for which a 
definition was created. How can any group maintain 
legitimacy with an unstable identity? This chapter 
reviews the reasons for various definitions, and details 
why the broad definition for INGOs, given in chapter one, 
has been adopted.
First, however, this chapter details how INGOs fit into 
the public segment of the world order, introduced in 
chapter one as 'global civil society'. For this thesis, 
global civil society was defined by contrast to the state 
segment and private segment. Within the public segment, 
however, lie important debates over the nature of global 
civil society. Many of these arguments are germane to 
the issue of the power wielded by INGOs. In particular, 
the definition one accepts for global civil society 
informs whether INGOs are considered a subset, or the 
very definition of the term.
As such, this chapter first critically reviews the range 
of definitions in use, and shows that placing INGOs 
within global civil society as an organizing force is
14
much more reflective of reality than considering INGOs as 
the entirety of global civil society. This will serve as 
a prelude to defining the INGO, which allows a discussion 
of who does and does not consider INGOs part of global 
civil society, their reasons for doing so, and the reason 
it is valuable to stabilize a single view of the INGO 
place in the world order.
Perceptions and Criticisms of INGOs
An undefined 'INGO community' is credited for the wide 
range of impact that INGO work accomplishes. The work 
attributed to this community covers a wide range of 
positive and negative, understated and exaggerated 
images. Reviewing academic literature for the beneficial 
work of INGOs, for instance, would appear to show that 
INGOs can be critical players in the world order:
« INGOs transfer and implement 13% (US$8.3 billion) of 
the world's development aid^ ,^
• INGOs mediate and help resolve international 
conf licts^^,
• INGOs broker international pollution-control deals^®.
Donini, Antonio. 1995. "The Bureaucracy and the Free 
Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in the Relationship 
Between the UN and INGOs," INGOs, the UN and Global 
Governance Ed. Weiss, Gordenkerl pi 88.
Mahlawi, Farouk. 1993. "New Conflicts, New Challenges," 
Journal of International Affairs 46, 2. p. 392.
Haas, Peter. 1994. "Do Regimes Matter?" International 
Organization : a reader Ed. Kratochwil, Mansfield. p .137.
15
• INGOs redefine the meaning of human rights^^
• INGOs act to bring about the decommission of nuclear 
reactors, broker cease-fires in civil wars, and 
publicize human rights abuses of repressive regimes^°
Conversely, a review of the literature highlighting the 
problems with INGOs show that their work is not without 
valid criticism:
• INGOs are a vocal minority that imposes its policy 
preferences on the majority^^,
• With no legal personality in the world order, INGOs 
have no accountability for their actions and cannot 
be bound to agreements'^,
• As they have a narrow focus, INGOs ignore the wider 
implications of their actions on the public^^.
Connors, Jane. 1996. "NGOs and the Human Rights of 
Women at the United Nations," The Conscience of the 
World Ed. Peter Willetts. p. 147.
Knickerbocker, Brad. 2000. "Nongovernmental 
Organizations are fighting - and winning - social, 
political battles" Christian Science Monitor Service.
p . 1.
21 Stanbury, W.T. 2 000. Environmental Groups and the 
International Conflict 'Over the Forests of British 
Columbia, 1990 to 2000. SFU-UBC Centre for the Study of 
Government and Business. Vancouver, BC. p. 355.
22 Spiro, Peter. 2002. "Accounting for INGOs". Chicago 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 3. No. 1. Spring,
2002. p. 168.
23 Stanbury review this in the context of the 
internationalization of the forestry dispute by various 
environmental groups in British Columbia. See:
Stanbury, W.T. 2 000. Environmental Groups and the 
International Conflict Over the Forests of British 
Columbia, 1990 to 20Û0. SFU-UBC Centre for the Study of 
Government and Business. Vancouver, BC. pp. 32 5-32 9.
16
In the very act of delivering their services, INGOs 
can disenfranchise citizens,
• The work of INGOs undermines sovereignty^^
These important criticisms are the challenges which a 
system of INGO accreditation could ameliorate. Their 
impact on INGO legitimacy is related in chapter three. 
Note in these criticisms that, even while the 'good' 
accomplished by the work of INGOs may be under debate, 
their capacity to have impact is not. Whether they are 
regarded as 'good' or 'bad' factors by a given segment of 
the world order, in the 21®*^  century, their potential to 
effect change is not denied by even their strongest 
critics.
An individual INGO can be recognized by all segments of 
the world order as capable of effecting change. The next 
section shows, however, that their power to effect change 
is predicated on acting as agents for global civil 
society.
24 Wood argues for this in the case of delivery of 
services in developing countries that supplants service 
delivery by the state. See
Wood, Geof. 1997. "States Without Citizens; The Problem 
of the Franchise State". NGOs, States and Donors : Too 
Close for Comfort?, Ed. David Hulme and Michael Edwards, : 
Save the Children Fund, New York, NY.
Stanbury, W.T. 2 000. Environmental Groups and the 
International Conflict Over the Forests of British 
Columbia, 1990 to 2000. SFU-UBC Centre for the Study of 
Government and Business. Vancouver, BC. pp. 362-363.
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Debates Over "Global Civil Society"
This section critically assesses definitions of global 
civil society to help identify the agendas behind 
different uses of the term. This section starts by 
reviewing the origins of the term 'civil society', and 
why it was first coined. To resolve why the term has 
become so ambiguous, the reasons for the practical 
definition adopted by the Commission on Global 
Governance(COGG), will be contrasted with the reasons for 
the definition adopted by Canada's North-South Institute 
(NSI). It will be shown that the NSI definition provides 
a more general, accurate picture of global civil society 
because, like the definition adopted by this thesis, it 
explains the importance of defining global civil society 
by contrast to state and the market.
The historical roots of the term 'civil society' give a 
valuable starting point to understanding the current use 
of the term. English philosopher John Locke is credited 
with developing the concepts associated with modern use 
of the term^^. He used the term 'civil society' to refer 
to all the social transactions that did not involve the 
state. Locke only saw value in government insofar as it 
helped civil society in the pursuit of its goals. He saw 
civil society as "a defence of human society at the
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national level against the power of the state and the 
inequalities of the marketplace"^^.
In Civil Society: The Development Solution?, the NSI 
applies Locke's "civil society" to a definition of 
"global civil society" . In seeking to explain state 
definitions of global civil society, the NSI launches 
into a critical and historical analysis of the use of the 
term. Most usefully, the NSI demonstrates three facets 
of the concept of civil society;
• as a structure : like the structure adopted in this 
thesis, NSI first explains organized civil society 
as a building, with organizations serving as the 
building's constituent bricks. Using this model, the 
bricks which constitute civil society would simply 
be all those which were not in the state, or the 
private sector. This implies that the INGO is 
distinct in that its makeup is not organized on the 
principle of gaining political power, or private 
gain.
North-South Institute. 1996. Civil Society: The 
Development Solution?. Website: http://www.nsi-
ins.ca/ensi/civil_society/papers/paper.html
Frederick, Howard. 1993. Global Communication and 
International Relations, Wadsworth Publishing. Belmont, 
CA. p. 2?0.
North-South Institute. 1996. Civil Society: The 
Development Solution?. Websitel http://www.nsi- 
ins ■ ca/ensi/civil_s(5ciety/papers/paper .html
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as relations : NSI's second model for civil society 
explains that the mortar which would hold the bricks 
together in such a metaphoric building would be the 
relations between organizations. Using this view, 
the focus of attention shifts to relations between 
segments of the world order.
in terms of environment : there is a very specific 
enabling environment which civil society requires in 
order to function effectively. This includes the 
right to associate, a democratic political system, 
and a culture of association, among other things.
The NSI's agenda in analysing definitions of the term is 
to determine why use of the term in practice is different 
than established understandings. To do this, the NSI 
reviewed the definitions used by some forty 
practitioners, to discover that the term excites interest 
because of its promise to provide "effective, credible, 
and equitable agents [other than the state or market]
The NSI explains that this very excitement leads to 
oversimplification and misuse of the term.
The same oversimplification was made by the Commission on 
Global Governance, in their 1995 book. Our Global
^ Ibid. 
^ Ibid.
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Neighbourhood^^. As an independent, top-level group of 
international relations academics and diplomats, COGG 
tasked itself to present a modern, 'enlightened' vision 
of the system of world affairs. The Commission held that 
while the citizens of the globe are the most important 
units of analysis, INGOs are the best expression of that 
'global civil society' .
It obscures the important facets of Locke's definition of 
"civil society" to include business, yet that is 
precisely what COGG does. They include "business and the 
professions"^^ in their definition of global civil 
society. This structure serves to define civil society 
wholly by contrast to the state. This does clarify 
distinctions between the state and non-state actors to 
the obfuscation of the differences between different non­
state actors. As shown in the section below, some of the 
motivating factors of INGOs are critically different from 
those of the market, and inform the very identity of the 
INGO.
Controlling INGO Identity
This section will explore the variety of definitions for 
the term "INGO", and explain how each is tailored to
Commission on Global Governance. 1995. Our Global 
Neighbourhood, Oxford University Press. Oxford, ÜK.
32 Ibid. p. 254.
33 Ibid. p. 32.
21
support a chosen definition of identity in the world 
order. First, a practical modern history of INGOs shows 
the context for the discussion of definition. Second, a 
panel of experts shows that definitions serve only the 
purposes of the definer. Third, the UN's registration 
system for I N G O s i s  reviewed, and shown to be a clear 
example of an opportunity for the imposition of bias.
History of INGO Identity
The term 'INGO' has been applied to a wide variety of 
organizations. The Union of International Associations 
(UIA) currently records some 25,000 organization which 
meets its qualifications for status as an INGO^^. The 
terms of reference for the UIA's definitions of INGOs is 
under the authority of the UN's Economic and Social 
Council. Definitions which are given through the UN are 
addressed later in a subsequent section.
The value of the UIA database is that it considers a very 
broad range of organizations to be INGOs. Their concept 
of an INGO groups together Amnesty International and the 
James Bond 007 International Fan Club, Solar Cookers
The United Nations calls their registration system an 
'accreditation', but it does not meet the stringency 
suggested in chapter four, so the term 'registration' 
has been substituted here.
35 The UIA's website can be found at http://www.uia.org. 
Their database of international organizations is 
accessible over the web, and contains detailed 
information on the thousands of organizations profiled.
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International and Greenpeace^®. Why should one definition 
cover such a wide range of interest groups? The answer 
to this question is found in the history of the term 
itself.
Historically, groups known as INGOs have progressed from 
their relative inability to organize and thus to form 
shared goals. The movements of the past decades, 
discussed earlier, have had enormous impact on INGOs.
The past two decades, in particular, have seen the 
distribution of free, easy-to-use software for connecting 
through the Internet, as the World Wide Web was created. 
This technology has ultimately given INGOs, and all of 
global civil society a very inexpensive, global system 
for networking.
The end of the Cold War also brought more notice to 
INGOs. On one hand, as ideological barriers broke down, 
there were new opportunities for cooperation between the 
INGO community, the state and international bureaucrats. 
The United Nations, for example, became considerably more 
receptive to INGO participation in its decision-making 
processes®^. On the other hand, the increased role that 
INGOs were seen as demanding for themselves generated
These entries were found in the UIA online database of 
International Organizations with research time donated 
by the UIA in the summer of 2001.
Gordenker, Leon. Weiss, Thomas G. 1996. "Pluralizing 
Global Governance". INGOs, the UN and Global Governance, 
Ed. Thomas G . Weiss, Leon Gordenker. Lynne Reinner. 
Boulder, CO. p. 24.
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antipathy from states. In many cases, state 
representatives felt reluctant to tolerate INGOs in any 
international power politics^®.
In the midst of these mutually exclusive perceptions, the 
United Nations used the 1990s as a period for re-aligning 
its priorities and setting new agendas. A series of 
world conferences were convened throughout the decade, 
with the well-noted goal of determining what the main 
concerns of the world order would be for the future.
INGOs prepared and participated in nineteen of these 
world conferences, and whether welcomed, tolerated or 
shunned, they achieved a previously unreached level of 
influence in helping set the goals of the . This was 
all achieved despite the fact that INGOs have no formal 
power; indeed, they have no more than a consultative role 
in UN proceedings.
During these conferences, the INGO community organized 
fora which were termed "counter-conferences". These were 
frequently loud, public events. They were often funded, 
at least indirectly, by the United Nations. The
Cameron, Max. 1999. "Global Civil Society and the 
Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti- 
Personnel Mines". Canadian Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 86.
United Nations General Assembly. 2001. Reference 
Document on the participation of civil society in United 
Nations Conferences and special sessions of the GeneraT~ 
Assembly during the 1990s, Office of the President of 
the Millennium Assembly. United Nations. New York, NY. 
p. 2 .
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frequency of these fora has led to a standard practice at 
the United Nations that conference secretariats inform 
INGOs (which constitute only a portion of global civil 
society) about the role global civil society is to play 
at a given conf erence^°.
According to INGO specialist. Dr. David Hulme, the 
prominence of INGOs at world conferences generally takes 
media coverage away from the official events. The 
counter-conferences are more interesting to the public, 
and are seen as more relevant (by the media and the 
public) to the content of the conference than the 
administrative meetings of diplomats"".
It has further become established practice that the UN's 
NGO-Liaison Office provides briefings for the INGO 
community one to two days before the start of the 
conference, and that space is set aside for INGOs to give 
and receive these briefings^^.
Though the role INGOs have come to play is that of the 
tacit, if not explicitly understood, representatives of 
global civil society, this is not a legal identity for 
them. To be clear, this is a role obliquely given by the 
UN, and stands only in the absence of any other
^  Ibid, p. 6.
Hulme, David. Edwards, Michael. 1997. "NGOs, States and 
Donors: an overview". INGOs, States and Donors: Too 
Close for Comfort? Save the Children Fund. New York, NY.
^  Ibid.
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organized, credible agents. Further, even a formal 
acknowledgment by the UN, that INGOs represented all 
global civil society, (which has never occurred) would 
far from imply that all other segments of the world order 
would concur.
The role of INGOs in the world order is historically 
unstable. They represent global civil society in the 
absence of any other agent, but their place is 
controversial and many states have been uncomfortable 
with their inclusion in world conferences.
The INGO community has no history of a formal legal 
personality. In the absence of a recognized institution 
and standing in the world order, INGOs can be defined in 
any way one desires. In the next section, modern 
academic interpretations of the INGO show that the INGO 
community still has no global definition.
Current INGO Definitions
Defining the INGO, in the absence of a formally accepted 
meaning to the term, is an exercise in subjective 
judgement. While each definition may serve to stabilize 
the identity of the INGO community within the world 
order, each also serves a set of concealed philosophical 
assumptions about the role of global civil society in the 
world order.
The point of creating a simple concept to define an 
organic entity like an INGO is itself NOT an objective
26
exercise. In 1997, expert members of the Internet list 
server of the Academic Council of the United Nations 
System were asked for their perspectives on a broad-based 
definition of the INGO. The responses offered by these 
international relations scholars confirm that definitions 
clarify only in that they help limit concepts of reality.
Dr. Kendall Stiles, a researcher at Loyola University in 
Chicago, went beyond practice, straight into theory when 
he cautioned against general definitions for the INGO.
He simply stated that the very theory underlying the 
construction of a definition would inform its nature. He 
counselled that the INGO could not be defined without a 
theoretical structure informing the definition. He 
showed this by pointing out that the definition would be 
different depending on whether the INGO was being 
considered, for instance, as a legal construct, or as a 
member of civil society^^.
Dr. Edwin Smith, a law professor at the University of 
Southern California, was concerned that the definition of 
the INGO also lay in the basis for the definition. He 
affirmed that "definitions derived for the purpose of 
answering a particular question may not have any 
relevance for answers to other questions " .  He stated
Stiles, Kendall. 1996. "Re: INGO Definition Outside 
IGOs". Online posting. ACUNS-IO Listserver. 20 May 1996. 
Website: http ://www.yale.edu/acuns/listserver.
Smith, Edwin. 1996. "Re: INGO Definition Outside IGOs". 
Online posting. ACUNS-IO Listserver. 21 May 1996. 
Website: http ://www.yale.edu/acuns/listserver.
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that the universal definition of the INGO would be 
pointless without some governing purpose ("Trying to 
determine a general definition may be an interesting but 
trivial exercise unless there is specific purpose to give 
the effort meaning"). He pointed out that every 
definition should be context dependent ("... the most 
useful course might be to caveat all definitions with a 
characterization of the purpose for which the definition 
was derived.")
UN staff member Gian Luca Burci agreed with Smith's 
interpretation, and suggested further that a universal 
definition of the INGO would be pointless given the 
dynamic change that is ongoing in the INGO community. He 
then gave examples of definitions that are used at the 
UN: in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), INGOs 
can only gain admittance if they have not-for-profit 
status, while this status is irrelevant for organizations 
making requests for exemption from economic sanctions^^.
The experts concluded that definitions served the 
interests of the definer. It is the intent of this 
section to show that it is in the interests of the INGO 
community to create their own definition, and thus 
control their identity. For proof of this concept, one 
need look no further than the biases implicit in the UN's 
definition of an INGO.
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INGO Identity at the UN
The UN is an intergovernmental body, which serves as both 
an arena for diplomats (representing states) to meet, and 
as an actor in its own right in international affairs.
As such, many non-state actors seek admittance to the UN, 
with the aim of influencing either the diplomats, or the 
direction of their debate.
To meet this demand, the UN has developed a process for 
determining which groups should be allowed access to UN 
facilities and officials (and the concomitant ability to 
influence the agenda).
It is instructive to note that the first three criteria 
an organization must meet to be considered an INGO in the 
eyes of the United Nations are blatantly pro-U.N.:
1. The organization shall be concerned with matters 
falling within the competence of the [United 
Nations] Economic and Social Council and its 
subsidiary bodies.
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be 
in conformity with the spirit, purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Burci, Gian Luca. "Re: INGO Definition Outside IGOs". 
Online posting. ACUNS-IO Listserver. 22 May 1996. 
http ://www.yale.edu/acuns/listserver.
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3. The organization shall undertake to support the
work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge 
of its principles and activities, in accordance 
with its own aims and purposes and the nature and 
scope of its competence and activities.
In practice, these three clauses are not controversial. 
The lack of controversy is reasonable, given that the 
Charter of the United Nations reflects principles which 
are public in nature, and thus coincide with the 
principles of INGOs. By contrast, if the UN were an avid 
proponent of the exploitation of child labour, clauses 
like those above might serve to exclude a lot more 
organizations from recognition as INGOs.
This definition is accepted and maintained at the 
discretion of the members of the UN. In similar 
circumstances, that discretion has been used for much 
more exclusionary purposes.
For example, at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women 
in Beijing, China, the UN refused to allow access to 
Tibetan INGOs^^. The rules for attending the conference
United Nations Economic and Social Council. 1996. 
"Consultative relationship between the United Nations 
and non-governmental organizations". United Nations 
Economic and Social Council Resolution No. 1996/31. New 
York, NY. p. 1.
Yuthok, Kunzang. 1995. "Tibetan INGO's Accreditation to 
United Nations Women's Conference in Beijing". World 
Tibet Network News, Website:
http://www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1995/6/25_3.html
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were enforced against eleven INGOs, which happened to 
have pro-Tibet agendas (an agenda strongly disavowed by 
the host state of China). One of the rules of 
registration for the conference was that all attending 
INGOs had to be incorporated in China. This gave China a 
valid rule which officials could subjectively enforce as 
a means of excluding undesirable INGOs.
Enforcement of these types of rules is at the discretion 
of the conveners. In 1992, for example, Maurice Strong, 
the organizer of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
allowed access to all INGOs that applied.
The lack of a bias-free definition does not imply that an 
INGO community exists. There is a thriving, self-aware 
community of INGOs, which is unaware that it cannot be 
defined. The next section describes that community of 
INGOs. It is important to identify this community, 
because its existence shows that there is a real body to 
which an accreditation system could be applied.
The INGO "Community"
INGOs, while diverse in scope and nature, have enough in 
common normatively to be an informal "community". This 
section looks at different concepts that are associated 
with the term "community", and the relevance of these 
concepts to INGOs.
The nature of 'community' is cross-disciplinary, but 
tends to focus on sociological or psychological aspects.
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The concepts of community offered by political science 
professor Dr. Richard Merelman serve as useful tools to 
categorize types of communities.
Dr. Merelman contextualizes a discussion of community in 
terms of political culture^®. Merelman developed this 
categorization to theorize on changing conceptualizations 
of stability in U.S. culture, but the conceptual tools 
are also useful in understanding the types of dynamics 
which characterize community among INGOs. Merelman 
breaks communities into two categories: Inglehartian 
political culture, which is critical and dynamic, and 
mundane political culture, which seeks commonalities^®.
First, what he terms 'Inglehartian political culture' is 
a specific and structurally systematic type of community. 
By transmitting widely shared attitudes through 
generations, it relies on empirically observable 
phenomena, and is thus consistent in different social 
contexts. In such a culture, people "strive to explain 
terms and share definitions"®®.
Second, what Merelman terms 'mundane political culture' 
is an inclusive way of sharing in a community. Concepts 
used in the community are not analyzed and may have
Merelman, Richard. 1998. "The Mundane Experience of 
Political Culture". Political Communication, Oct-Dec 98, 
Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 515.
^  Ibid, p. 530.
^ Ibid, p. 523.
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different associations to different people in the same 
setting. It is meant to be comforting and inclusive. It 
allows discourse about a topic to continue without the 
obstacle of ensuring that everyone has the same 
interpretation of the object under discussion.
These two concepts are useful in understanding the types 
of actions that occur within communities, and thus help 
identify groupings that constitute communities. For 
example, if the INGO community is actively Inglehartian, 
they would only develop a shared purpose once a common 
aim had been debated and agreed upon. If the INGO 
community were more mundane, then the shared meanings 
would be less credible, as their purpose would be to 
create a sense of community.
For example, attending the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights as a representative of the United Nations 
Association in Canada, I was struck by how quickly an 
emotional connection allowed INGOs with very different 
agendas to present the community of INGOs as a united 
front. At the same time, the state representatives were 
engaging in critical debate to establish a community 
based on Inglehartian principles. While practical points 
of funding, preparation and familiarity played a role in 
the nature of each community, the disparity between the 
two was obvious^^. To even the least experienced of
Frizzell, Garth. 1993. Personal Observation, United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights. Vienna,
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observers, the methods by which the INGOs achieved 
community bounded as they were by time and urgency, 
appeared to be more mundane, and emotionally driven than 
the measured discussions of the diplomats in the formal 
conference.
The exercise of understanding these contrasting concepts 
of community helps highlight the attributes of community 
held by the INGO community in the world order. This is 
an important pursuit for the INGO community; the scarcity 
of historical recognition of this community's influence 
on world affairs stems in part from a lack of identity 
for the community.
In his analysis of power. Dr. Kenneth E. Boulding 
recognized the relatively unheralded importance INGOs 
have played, and described it as "perhaps one of the most 
spectacular developments of the twentieth century, 
although it has happened so quickly that it is seldom 
noticed.
Chapter three shows that this lack of identity, and lack 
recognition, reduces the INGO community's potential for 
power, from a conditioning power to a tactical influence.
Austria. June 14-25, 1993
 ^Boulding, Kennel 
Park, CA. p. 244
th. 1989. Three Faces of Power, Newbury
34
Chapter 3 : INGO Legitimacy is INGO Power
The goals of the INGO community make impact in the world 
order, but this does not come through wielding overt 
power. Rather, INGO community is made through the 
practice of tactical influence. Thus, their power 
relates to their perceived legitimacy by those over whom 
they wish to exert power.
First, this chapter categorizes the types of power used 
in the world order, and shows how INGOs have a special 
ability to wield conditioned power (as distinct from 
condign or compensatory power). With this as a 
framework, the chapter shows the obstacles to power that 
the INGO community faces in the current world order: lack 
of institutionalization preventing control of identity 
and the concomitant lack of legitimacy.
Concepts of Power and the INGO Community
The critical analysis of the term 'power' in the world 
order is a major topic in international relations 
literature. From introductory texts^^ to advanced papers.
The classic study which first identified legitimate, 
referent, reward, coercive and expert power, see:
French, J. Raven, B. 1959. "The Bases of Social Power". 
Studies in Social Power. Ed. D. Cartwright. Ann Arbor, 
USA. Institute for Social Research.
For an example of an introductory text in International 
Relations, see Dougherty, James. Pfaltzgraff Jr.,
Robert. 199 0. Contending Theories of International 
Relations : a comprehensive survey, HarperCollins. New 
York, NY.
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the discussion of the nature of power has been a constant 
issue in the discipline. A traditional interpretation 
of the goals of the entire discipline of International 
Relations could be said to be an attempt to understand 
what power is and how to maintain its balance^^.
To clearly understand the different options available in 
a definition of power, chapter one compared Kenneth 
Boulding's radical definition of power with that offered 
by conservative John Kenneth Galbraith. Generally, they 
analysed power as shown in figure 2.
Segment
State Condign Power Destructive Power
Market Compensatory Power Productive Power
Global Civil 
Society
Conditioning Power Integrative Power
Figure 2: Galbraith^ Boulding Categories of Power
This thesis adopts their shared choice of categorization, 
but for the sake of simplicity, uses the terminology 
suggested by Galbraith: condign, compensatory and 
conditioning power.
What Galbraith termed 'condign power' is the ability of 
one person or group to force the other to change their 
behaviour against their will. Galbraith explains condign
55 Ibid. pp. 3 0-35.
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power in discreet terms, assuming that the threat of 
violence is more powerful than violence itself. He says 
that the exercise of condign power lets one "...win 
submission by inflicting or threatening appropriately 
adverse consequences"^®.
While Boulding has a similar category, he is more blunt 
in describing 'destructive power' (his term for condign 
power) as the potential to threaten (implicitly or 
explicitly) or destroy someone or something®^.
In the world order detailed earlier, it is the state 
segment which holds this condign power. This is the 
ability to coerce a person or organization against her or 
its will.
By its nature, condign power must be backed up by the 
ability to enforce threats, and at the global level, only 
states have that power (though this ideal is increasingly 
compromised by mercenary groups like "Executive Outcomes" 
and "Combat Force"®®) . Though obvious arguments could be 
made for the ability of terrorist organizations to wield 
condign power, this thesis is only interested in the use
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, 
Houghton-Mifflin. Boston, MA. p. 5,
Boulding, Kenneth. 1989. Three Faces of Power, Sage 
Publications. Newbury Park, CA.
®® For more discussion on the rise of the private sector 
mercenary organization, see:
Brayton, Steven. 2002. "Outsourcing war: Mercenaries and
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of condign power within the formal structure of the world 
order. This thesis considers condign power only in the 
context of states.
By contrast, compensatory power is the ability of a 
person or group to bring about behavioural changes in 
another person or group through reward. Galbraith points 
out that in the modern context :
the most important expression of compensatory power 
is... the payment of money for services rendered, 
which is to say for submission to the economic or 
personal purposes of others.
Boulding's 'productive power' has a similar theme. He 
describes it as the potential to get what one wants 
through exchange®^ . Interestingly enough, Boulding's 
definition suggests much less coercion than Galbraith's. 
This is because Boulding has associated the coercive side 
of power with his 'destructive power'.
Galbraith's description is much more useful to this 
thesis, as it more clearly correlates to the real-life 
presence of TNCs and financial flows, private factors 
which influence the world order tremendously. Where
the Privatization of peacekeeping". Journal of 
International Affairs. New York, NY.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, 
Houghton-Mifflin. Boston, MA. p. 5.
Boulding, Kenneth. 1989. Three Faces of Power, Sage 
Publications. Newbury Park, CA.
Boulding's definition is talking about a process, 
Galbraith's is categorizing specific acts of power.
For the INGO community, the dangerous implication of 
compensatory power is in its coercive ability to change 
the mission and raison d'être of individual INGOs. As 
shown later in this chapter, INGO legitimacy and power is 
predicated on their pursuit of public-oriented goals. 
Whether compensatory power, in its exercise, changes 
these goals or not in a given case, the perception of its 
coercive effect can detract from the perceived 
independence of an INGO, and thus make it appear less 
legitimate.
The impact of compensatory power on the programs of the 
INGO community is a key issue to the INGO community®^, 
dealing with the topic of whether the INGO community is 
compromised by the influence of compensation by states.
As seen in the history of the development of the INGO 
community, the relationship between the state segment, 
the private segment and INGOs is changing and evolving 
over time. Amidst this change, the INGO community's 
challenge is to maintain and enhance its credibility to 
other segments of the world order as a valid agent for
For example, the INGO 'Save the Children', is a strong 
supporter of different measures of INGO accountability. 
For its analysis of the impact of state funding on 
INGOs, see, for instance: Hulme, David. Edwards,
Michael. 1997. INGOs, States and Donors; too close for 
comfort? Save the Children Fund. New York, NY.
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global civil society. Maintaining an image of having a 
"special relationship with the p o o r , and a "special 
connection at the local l e v e l i s  accurate, but in order 
to leverage this aspect for legitimating, the INGO 
community would need to adopt specified norms, determined 
in an Inglehartian manner by the INGO community itself.
A code of ethics, for example, would be one 
implementation of such an objective standard.
A state's legitimacy is sanctioned through their 
governing authority, and the private organization by 
nature of ownership. There is no concomitant mandate by 
the public to the INGO community. The INGO community 
exercises their power in the absence of mandate. In 
order to wield what power they can, INGOs must establish 
trust by presenting a credible organization, determine 
their identity, and ensure that the other players in the 
world order recognize them. The conversion of their 
influence into power lies in this establishment of 
legitimacy.
INGO power is predicated on establishing that the 
organization is a legitimate, credible player in the 
world order. To understand INGO power, one must 
understand the third category of power, which works to
Ibid. p. 3.
Brown, L. David. 1992. "Sowing Self-Sufficiency: non­
governmental organizations as development catalysts". 
Harvard International Review, Fall92, Vol. 15, Issue 1. 
p. 19.
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legitimize organizations, and inculcate their missions. 
Conditioned power is exercised by changing attitudes, 
behaviour and belief. By contrast, it is a much more 
subtle type of power, but much more encompassing than the 
previous two categories. It causes a person or 
organization to submit to one's will without recognizing 
that they have submitted. It involves convincing others 
that it is right and proper to follow a new or different 
course of action®^.
Again, Boulding bundles some coercion into a category.
His 'integrative power' describes the potential to get 
others to act in order to please you®^. Boulding 
describes this power as the ability to create 
relationships.
The most important attributes required to develop and 
maintain conditioned power, according to Galbraith, is 
the ability to organize®®. Accordingly, the process which 
leads from organization to institutionalization builds 
much more power and legitimacy than the sum power of the 
individuals in the community.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, 
Houghton-Mifflin. Boston, MA. p . 6.
Boulding, Kenneth. 1989. Three Faces of Power, Sage
Publications. Newbury Park, CA,
®® Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1983. The Anatomy of Power, 
Houghton-Mifflin. Boston, MA. ppl 6-7
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The actual act of organization is considered to be one of 
the key defining strengths of members of the INGO 
community. The World Bank has been very involved in 
encouraging INGO participation in its policy development. 
They feel that INGOs draw significant legitimacy from 
civil society:
The organizational capacity that comes to life 
through INGOs and becomes engaged in 
development action represents its fundamental 
strategic resource and crucial contribution®^.
This direct connection to global civil society gives 
INGOs an initial sense of legitimacy from the public they 
serve, which in turn is the basis of INGO conditioned 
power.
Part of the reason that the World Bank opened its doors 
to the INGO community in the 1990s was because of high 
profile pressure from a group of 150 INGOs®®. The fact 
that half the bank's lending projects have some form of 
INGO participation stems from the political power which 
the INGO wields simply by lending their legitimacy 
through approving or rejecting public and political 
support. The willing support of the INGO community, and 
their broad dismantling of that opposition would arguably
Cernea, Michael. 1988. Nongovernmental Organizations 
and Local Development, World Bank. Washington, DC. p. 8.
Simmons, P.J. 1998. "Learning to Live With INGOs", 
Foreign Policy, Fall 98 Issue 112. p. 85.
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have been much more difficult to accomplish through the 
application of condign or compensatory power.
INGOs can be put in unique situations that suggest their 
capacity to manipulate or assist constitutes condign or 
compensatory power. For example, with all states 
polarized by the downfall of the Soviet regime in Russia 
in 1990, the Italian INGO Communita di Saint 'Egidio was 
the only actor that could pull off hosting informal 
meetings of warring factions in Mozambique®®.
One way members of the INGO community effect change in 
the world order is by influencing the workings of the 
inter-state apparatus. In short, when policy is being 
made at inter-state fora, INGOs may have fairly direct 
influence on all aspects of the process.
Exercising Conditioned Power
The practical exercise of power in the world order 
involves policy-making, policy-enacting, and auditing. 
Following these three steps leads one from the initial 
idea, to determining a formal policy, taking action on 
the policy, then confirming that the action taken was in 
accordance with the policy.
^ Ibid. p. 86.
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It is important to note here that the context for 
exercising power at the global level is one with no 
central authority. The United Nations is simply an arena 
for players to meet; its founding principles ensure that 
a state actor cannot be compelled through condign power. 
Except under very specific conditions, the UN charter 
prohibits states from impinging on another state's 
sovereignty.
Outside the UN, however, the global policy-makers in the 
state segment operate in a system where 'might makes 
right'. The only power which is exercised is done so on 
the basis of the power which actors have themselves 
collected. With this as a framework, INGOs can wield 
their conditioned power to an extent bounded only by the 
constant reminder that states are the holders of condign 
power.
Policy-making
The act of making global policy should be broken into two 
phases: the determining of agendas, then the determining 
of policy. This is important, because the setting of an 
agenda is the single proactive event which initiates and 
guides the entire process. Actual policy-making is 
relatively reactionary and follows a very fixed process, 
regardless of the venue.
Throughout post-Westphalian history, INGOs have exercised 
their greatest power as agenda-setters. In the 1800s, it 
was INGOs like the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery
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Society, and the Anglo-Oriental Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade which drove governments to 
take action. Indeed it was the INGO community which was 
largely responsible for ensuring that the United Nations 
charter included language on Human Rights’”.
In the current world order, the INGO community tends to 
be the main source of new issues when global policy­
makers are setting their agendas. This is a natural role 
for INGOs for three reasons: INGOs are, in part, created 
to address the issues which governments ignore; modern 
governments are designed to tackle short-term issues; and 
INGOs by their nature have branches in many countries, 
and are aware of issues which are not pertinent to 
national governments” .
The first of these issues informs the very identity of 
the members of the INGO community, and should be taken 
into consideration in any attempt to define organizations 
that are or are not INGOs.
A major reason for the existence of INGOs is 
that people come together in independent groups
Simmons, P.J. 1998. "Learning to Live With INGOs", 
Foreign Policy, Fall 98 Issue 112. p. 85.
” Willets, Peter. 1996. "Consultative Status for INGOs at 
the United Nations". The Conscience of the World, Ed. 
Peter Willetts. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC. p. 46.
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to promote some type of activity that is not 
being undertaken by governments.
As discussed below, expertise and organization on a topic 
develop with growth of any community which has been 
formed for a specific purpose. The strength of purpose 
can be even stronger in cases where an INGO was formed 
not to address a new issue, but to combat decisions made 
by states or corporations.
The second reason that INGOs are uniquely powerful in 
setting the global agenda for political action is that 
government is structured in a way to respond to the most 
critical short-term issues first. Often, long-term 
issues will be overlooked unless INGOs are available to 
highlight the concern.
Peter Willets, the Brookings Institution researcher who 
analyses INGOs by comparing them to pressure groups, 
points out that state governments are more in the 
business of responding to events than they are of setting 
the agenda^^. The INGO community brings the issue to the 
global table, and the state representatives take on the 
task of finding a context to deal with the issue.
The third facet of the world order which makes INGOs 
credible agents for agenda-setting is the fact that
^ Ibid. 
^ Ibid.
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nations naturally have national interest as their guiding 
mission. By contrast, an individual INGO only begins to 
earn the credibility and respect which lend it power, 
when it has the public issue itself as a guiding 
interest.
In order to make the most use of their role, it is useful 
for INGOs to have branches in many countries, (for 
example, Greenpeace has offices in 53 countries around 
the world, and Amnesty International has offices in 162 
states and territories) and to have a professional means 
for dealing with the media^^. The branches help give 
INGOs the credibility to bring issues to the table. Media 
savvy gives INGOs the power to use global news and 
communications systems as an alternate means of getting 
an issue onto the global agenda.
In addition to an individual INGO having branches in more 
than one country, the INGO community can network together 
to bring more of global civil society into the process of 
agenda setting. When an issue is highlighted through the 
INGO community network, an enormous amount of attention 
can be brought to bear on one specific issue area.
^  Ibid.
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The action of convening these types of networks is itself 
powerful. First, this so-called 'swarm e f f e c t c a n  be 
organized simply using the modern Internet and 
telecommunications techniques to disseminate information. 
The resulting impact can be hard for governments to deal 
with. Second, the actual process of building such a 
network further enhances the institutionalization that is 
vital to legitimating the INGO community, in the eyes of 
global civil society, private interests and states.
Once an issue has been initially brought to the table, 
the INGO community still has impact on the issues. The 
community can mobilize support or opposition to an agenda 
item. As explained later when discussing legitimacy, the 
work of the INGO community completely stopped the 
discussions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
Seattle in 2001.
Conversely, the INGO community often offers assistance in 
getting an agenda item expedited. If INGOs have enough 
expertise in their ranks, they sometimes will even draft 
research reports or wording for the policy under 
negotiation^®. During the 1997 negotiations in Ottawa to 
ban landmines, the INGO community mobilized 350
"The Non-governmental Order: Will INGOs Democratise, or 
Merely Disrupt, Global Governance". The Economist. 
12/11/99. Vol. 353, Issue 8149. p. 221
Willets, Peter. 1996. "Consultative Status for INGOs at 
the United Nations". The Conscience of the World, Ed. 
Peter Willetts. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC. p. 48.
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organizations, and initiated a professional media 
campaign (which included Superman® and Batman® comic 
books). Through a variety of fortunate events, and the 
proactive work of states, the campaign initiated by INGOs 
became a fast-track treaty, adopted within 14 months^^.
To reiterate, it was states that adopted the ban, but it 
was the INGO community which brought the item to the 
states' agenda, and helped keep pressure on states to 
keep the process moving forward.
INGOs are a significant force for bringing forward items 
for the global agenda. The INGO community uses its 
credibility to raise the issues that have no other means 
to be brought up. INGOs play an instrumental role in the 
agenda-setting phase for making policy in the world 
order.
Policy-enacting
INGOs may or may not influence the actual implementation 
of a policy. The impact will depend on the specific 
issue, and the context surrounding the issue. For 
instance, if the issue is of tremendous interest to state 
governments, the private segment or to the rest of global 
civil society, sufficient political will should have been 
developed to ensure that the policy is enacted as
Simmons, P.J. 1998. "Learning to Live With INGOs", 
Foreign Policy, Fall 98 Issue 112. p. 83.
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expected^®, without further pressure from the INGO 
community.
INGOs can play an enormous role in the implementation of 
many facets of international policy, particularly when it 
involves the distribution of humanitarian aid. In fact, 
the INGO community is recognized as being able to perform 
many of the tasks of United Nations agencies, in 
particular, much better than the agency could do itself^®. 
While a good indicator of how INGOs derive their 
credibility, being a service provider reflects a 
different role for INGOs to play in the world order.
When INGOs are delivering services, they become, in 
effect, the contracted representatives of donors. The 
specifications determined in operational policies are 
conveyed to INGOs, but by the time the policies reach 
them, the time for negotiating and changing those 
policies is long past. In short, when INGOs take on the 
role of service provider, they serve the needs of those 
who define policy.
Willets, Peter. 1996. "Consultative Status for INGOs at 
the United Nations". The Conscience of the World, Ed. 
Peter Willetts. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC. p. 47.
Drake, Christine. 1994. "The United Nations and INGOs: 
future roles". Reordering the World: geopolitical 
perspectives on the 21st century] Eds. George Demko. 
William B. Wood. Westview Press. Boulder, CO. p. 2 65.
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Furthermore, as Willets points out, governments will 
often contract out to INGOs when the operations to be 
carried out are undesirable for the state^°. If the state 
wants to distance itself from a particular policy like 
sex education, INGOs can be the ideal vehicle for service 
delivery.
Thus, outsourcing these controversial political services 
effectively allows the state to distance itself from 
politically challenging issues, while making the INGO 
community the focus of any discord. These cases make 
effective counterpoint to some of the criticisms noted in 
chapter two, specifically that INGOs impose their policy 
preferences and that they undermine sovereignty. At 
worst, the offloading of undesirable responsibilities 
from state to INGOs shows that INGOs can be as much the 
victim of such tactics as they are the abusers.
It is important for INGOs to be as involved as possible 
in influencing and changing policy before it is 
determined. When that work has been completed, the last 
role INGOs play is in ensuring that states carry out the 
policies which have been developed at the global level.
Willets, Peter. 1996. "Consultative Status for INGOs at 
the United Nations". The Conscience of the World, Ed.
Peter Willetts. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC. p . 48.
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Auditing Policy
The audit function, which is a mechanism of ensuring that 
states live up to promises made in the heat of global 
negotiations, is frustrating, painstaking, and at times 
annoying. INGOs wishing to monitor compliance with global 
promises must be very observant and reactive to the 
results that occur following global conferences.
As Willets notes, once INGOs have noticed that 
governments have not fulfilled obligations, the next step 
is to use public persuasion to encourage the state to 
comply. This actually involves the global equivalent of 
a shaming ritual. INGOs will purposefully try to 
embarrass government officials into complying with 
obligations®^.
Public embarrassment is one of the ways that the INGO 
community exerts power on state government. The 
technique is based in conditioned power, as INGOs 
specifically seek to re-educate global civil society. 
Embarrassment campaigns differ from propaganda in that 
the former are most effective when they are most factual, 
while the latter is about intentional deceit of the 
public.
As an example, delegates representing the state segment 
met in September of 1997 to frame the Convention on the
^ Ibid.
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Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction 
(the so-called 'Ottawa Process'). During the 
discussions, INGO representatives were forthright in 
telling states that their positions were contradictory, 
even when it embarrassed the state representative®^.
INGOs also help set up the verification schemes which 
ensure that agreements are met. INGOs may even have the 
best technical experts to design compliance processes®®. 
In the particular case of environmental policy 
development, while it is ultimately a political decision 
to determine which threshold levels are used in policy, 
it is the technical expert who can explain the 
implications of different thresholds®^.
When the INGO community does not participate in the 
process, and even opposes the passage of policy
Cameron, Max. 1999. "Global Civil Society and the 
Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti- 
Personnel Mines". Canadian Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 92.
®® The Mediterranean Action Plan, for instance, was an 
INGO comprised of technical experts in pollution, from 
various Mediterranean states. For a review of their 
work, see:
Haas, Peter. 1994. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic 
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control". 
International Organization: a reader, Ed. Friedrich 
Kratochwil. E. Mansfield. HarperCollins College 
Publishers. New York, NY.
Weintraub, Bernard. 1992. "Science, International 
Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary 
Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms" New 
York University Environmental Law Journal, New York 
University. New York. NY. pi 91
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altogether, they have power to mobilize a great deal of 
opposition. INGOs will even oppose the state with 
demonstrations or other confrontational tactics®^.
Resistance to the state is explicitly noted. Some 
members of the INGO community call for INGOs to stand on 
their morals if they feel their government is not acting 
in accordance with principles. Charles Elliot, former 
head of a Christian INGO, calls on INGOs to question the 
legitimacy of governments to ensure that they do not 
"collude with the morally unacceptable."®^ He furthers 
this argument by giving a series of methods by which 
INGOs can measure the legitimacy of the government. In 
so doing, he shows that state legitimacy should be 
questioned as much as INGO legitimacy.
In summary, INGOs have the capacity to influence global 
decisions. They contribute to setting the agenda for 
global affairs. During global negotiations, the INGO can 
wield influence on the direction of debate. After policy 
has been determined, INGOs often are chosen to implement 
the policy, and when policy has been implemented, the 
INGO community is often the only watchdog to ensure that 
states comply with policy or that policy is carried out.
Livernash, Robert. 1992. "The Growing Influence of 
INGOs in the Developing World". Environment, (June 
1992) vol. 34, no. 5. p. 14.
Elliot, Charles. 1995. "A new challenge for the INGO 
sector". Conrad Groebel Review, Vol. 13. No 3. p. 251.
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It is noteworthy that the positions of influence accorded 
INGOs in the previous section come from neither 
authority, nor institutionalized power. INGOs 'power' is 
exercised through influence, and the level of power is 
connected to ability to influence. In turn then, 
credibility and the appearance of legitimacy play a key 
role in INGO power.
INGO Community Legitimacy
Whether it is accurate or not to assume that INGOs are 
legitimate representatives of global civil society in 
some sense or another, they are often portrayed and 
perceived as such. The goal of this thesis is to show 
that the INGO community can institutionalize their 
perceived legitimacy and construct a more solid identity 
in the world order through accreditation.
Before seeking this new identity, however, this section 
investigates the common assumptions about current INGO 
community legitimacy. Are INGOs truly "the most effective 
voices for the concerns of ordinary people in the 
international arena"®^? With no authorization from the 
stakeholders they purport to represent, can INGOs truly 
be said to be representative of global civil society?
Global Policy Forum. 2002. "NGOs". Website: 
http ://WWW.globalpolicy.org/ngos/index.htm
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Regardless of any true authorization by the public to 
speak on their behalf, INGOs are often portrayed as such 
by the media. For instance, during the 2 001 WTO meeting 
in Seattle, protesting INGOs were dubbed by the Economist 
magazine as "civil society"®®.
This is by no means a universally held view. For 
example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 
reporting on the same WTO meetings, spoke of INGOs as 
manipulators of the public, not as global civil society:
One of the more impressive innovations has 
been the method of organizing, arranging and 
directing the operational and administrative 
activities .. without the obvious influence of 
central authority, command or control.®"®
Calling INGOs legitimate representatives of global civil 
society is a subjective judgment call. No INGO could 
fully represent all interests of society. Rather, they 
are, by nature, tied to specific issues, and within their 
purview, can become experts.
In the case where INGOs are perceived as experts within 
their domain, they are often perceived as credible
The influential periodical. The Economist was one 
medium that so dubbed the protestors. See:
"The Non-governmental Order: Will INGOs Democratise, or 
Merely Disrupt, Global Governance". The Economist. 
12/11/99. Vol. 353, Issue 8149, p. 2D1
® Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 2 000. "Anti- 
Globalization - A Spreading Phenomenon" Perspectives. 
Report #2000/08. p. 7
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representatives of global civil society. This does not 
lend the expert INGOs credibility to everyone. INGOs are 
largely non-democratic organizations catering to a 
specific goal. Their credible role is not as an 
authority, but rather in that "they can bring publicity 
to certain issues, raise public awareness about what is 
being done, bridge the knowledge gap between 
international negotiators and real world conditions, and 
push for accountability by public officials" . In 
short, INGOs operate without authority in the current 
world order, but their credibility in the eyes of some 
affords them the capacity to make international issues 
their business.
To understand better the relationship between influence, 
legitimacy, and power, it is useful to consider more 
socially constructed concepts of power. The five 
categories of social power relate to the concepts of 
power discussed above, but are useful in that they 
distinguish between influence and power .
Cameron, Max. 1999. "Global Civil Society and the 
Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti- 
Personnel Mines". Canadian Foreign Policy, Fall 1999, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 96.
For a summary review, see, for example,
Fincham. R. Rhodes. P. 1999. Principles of 
Organizational Behaviour. Oxford University Press, UK. 
pf 441.
57
Legitimacy is seen in the social power literature as 
being conferred by an authority®^. This retains the 
problems discussed in chapter one; the world order has no 
central authority.
'Influence behaviour', or 'influence tactics', is similar 
to wielding power, in that a specific goal is sought. 
Unlike condign or compensatory power, however, influence 
tactics compel through convincing®^. They are, in short, 
a subset of the conditioning power described in chapter 
two.
For this thesis, legitimacy is considered in this sense, 
to be only attainable when targets confer it upon an 
agent. Once legitimacy is attained, an INGO is able to 
continue exerting influence, but can also exert power in 
other forms.
The field of organizational theory adds to the concepts 
of power previously noted. Galbraith and Boulding's 
triad of power types (condign, compensatory and 
conditioning) is augmented in organizational theory by 
the addition of 'legitimate power'. This is explained as 
having its basis in "the agreement by members of an
^ Ibid.
^ Ibid. p. 444.
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organization to comply with rules and legitimate requests 
in return for the benefits of membership" .
Legitimate power sets boundaries for authority; such a 
set of boundaries is needed in the segment of the world 
order where the INGO community resides. In the absence 
of any other authority, the INGO community can create its 
own legitimating structure, and manage its identity in 
the process.
With this understanding of the difference between 
authority, legitimacy, power and influence, one can 
identify INGOs by contrast to the other sectors of the 
world order. The next section turns to differences 
between the public segment, the private segment, and the 
state segment of the world order.
Generally, where the state holds condign and compensatory 
power over its citizens, the market holds compensatory 
power. To remain in the global civil society segment, 
the INGO community's defining mission cannot be the 
accumulation of condign or compensatory power. These 
types of power certainly assist any organization in 
achieving its goals, but they can never become the 
overriding goals of an INGO, lest it be considered to be 
outside of the global civil society segment.
Yukl, Gary. 2000. "Use Power Effectively". The 
Blackwell Handbook of Principles of Organizational
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Political parties are good examples of organizations 
which seek power, and thus cannot be considered INGOs. 
Similarly, corporations seek profit, over and above their 
operating costs, and thus are not considered INGOs.
The distinction between profit and non-profit motive is 
contentious. Currently, for example, INGOs deliver more 
aid through service work than all the branches of the 
United Nations put together®^. Yet these INGOs are not 
seen as market forces. The reason for this that INGOs do 
not seek to profit from the services they provide, over 
and above their operating costs.
It is a natural function of the world order that INGOs 
change their goals and missions to maintain funding for 
their institutions. Indeed, for INGOs to fulfill their 
role, they must seek causes or services which meet the 
interests of the public. As an issue is resolved, it is 
natural for an INGO to focus on a new issue, if only to 
maintain the advantages of organization and 
professionalism created by the funding for the previous 
cause or service.
Thus, when INGOs are placed in the world order in a 
position that has them filling structural needs, their
Behavior. Ed. Edwin Locke. Blackwell Publishers. Malden, 
USA. pp. 242-243.
"The Non-governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratise, or 
Merely Disrupt, Global Governance". The Economist. 
12/11/99. Vol. 353, Issue 8149, p. 2TÔ
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credibility should not be challenged for seeking causes 
that fund their institution. In such a case, they are, 
rather, meeting market needs, and fulfilling their 
structural role. This applies to the extent that they do 
not seek funding over and above their operating costs.
This discussion has shown that INGOs hold a role as 
legitimate actors in the world order. They represent the 
public, if only in the absence of any other organization. 
INGOs are hampered in their ability to perform as 
representatives of the public, however. This 
powerlessness is related back, as is shown in the next 
section, to the INGO community's lack of legitimacy.
Lack of Legitimacy as an Obstacle to Power
When the credibility of an individual INGO is called into 
question, it hurts the capacity of the entire community. 
Since the conditioned power INGOs wield is predicated on 
their portrayal and perception as legitimate agents of 
global civil society, questions of credibility are very 
harmful to the community. The types of actions which are 
particularly harmful to INGO credibility are those which 
question the INGOs' respect for sovereignty, and more 
damagingly, question whether INGOs act on behalf of the 
public.
The question of respect for sovereignty poses 
difficulties to the INGO community. When INGO policy 
conflicts with the law of a sovereign country (on such
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issues as women's rights, whaling, or racism), INGOs are 
put into the difficult position of having to choose 
whether or not to respect state laws. When INGOs ignore 
this, they are defying sovereignty rules. For example, 
Rwanda and Uganda have instituted INGO registration 
policies because INGOs frequently neglected to notify 
state officials when doing work in their country. 
Moreover, some of these INGOs engaged in national 
political acts^^. When organizations circumvent 
sovereignty, thus acting outside the rules of the 
international order, they pretend to a legitimacy which 
is the province of the state. As such, they call into 
question the precarious credibility of the INGO 
community.
Similarly, but on a more blunt and provocative scale, the 
actions of individuals within INGOs can call into 
question the validity of the entire community. In 2001, 
a scandal swept the INGO community, as it was determined 
that there was a significant pattern among INGO workers 
in West Africa, showing many had engaged in food-for-sex 
extortion.®’ The immediate and powerful response of the 
INGO community to sanction individuals demonstrated the 
seriousness of the issue for the individuals affected.
® Yaansah, Eddie Adiin. Harrell-Bond, Barbara. 2 000. 
"Regulating the Non-governmental Sector: the Dilemma". 
Website :
http ://WWW.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globalact/state/2 0 
00/1121.htm
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On a more callous level, however, it showed that the INGO 
community is desperately quick to quell scandals that 
impugn the credibility of the organization. Had Save the 
Children been slow to respond to the allegations of 
abuse, their credibility would have been destroyed, and 
they would have been rendered ineffective in activities 
among segments of the world order, (in that case, it was 
determined that the aid workers responsible were local 
employees of the UN^ ®) .
Conclusion
The INGO community has impact on global affairs. To 
understand how this impact is realized, this chapter 
critically analysed the very concepts of power and 
legitimacy.
INGOs wield a conditioning power. That is, individual 
INGOs cannot force compliance with their goals through 
force, and rarely have the compensatory power to compel 
compliance. Instead, INGOs have the power to influence 
belief and attitude.
The ability to wield conditioned power has been shown to 
be only available to those deemed legitimate to wield 
such a power. This legitimacy, is the key to conditioned
"Major INGO Groups Moves[sic] to Protect Children From 
Abuse". Reuters. 3/4/2002.
"UN Investigating Sex-for-Aid Charges". AfricaOnline. 
February 28, 2002. Website:
http ://WWW.africaonline.com/site/Artides/1,3,45952.jsp
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power, and thus to any impact which the INGO community 
wields in global affairs.
In short, this chapter followed the concepts of power 
backwards to show that legitimacy lends an air of 
authority, and authority (or credibility) underpins the 
ability of INGOs to wield conditioned power. This 
applies in relations between INGOs and any segment of the 
world order.
Thus, in order to wield the influence that the community 
has, it needs legitimacy and authority. Yet the INGO 
community faces obstacles because of their lack of 
institutionalized legitimacy. Chapter four explains what 
accreditation is, and demonstrates how the adoption of an 
accreditation system by INGOs will help them surmount 
these obstacles, and provide a valid means for 
accountability and legitimacy.
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Chapter 4 : Accreditation Legitimates
The points argued in this chapter show that accreditation 
is a very worthwhile goal for the Inglehartian and 
mundane INGO community^®. There are four key reasons that 
indicate that accreditation should be sought after by the 
INGO community: legitimacy, awareness of community to 
external groups, ownership of identity, and the 
establishment of a legal personality.
First, accreditation enhances the legitimacy of the 
accredited body. For INGOs, it will be shown that this 
means that the other segments of the world order would 
afford the INGO community more credibility, legitimacy 
and power if INGOs instated a system of accreditation.
Second, the process of developing a system of 
accreditation requires precisely defined boundaries for 
the group being accredited. These defined boundaries 
clarify and reinforce an internal understanding of 
community. The INGO community would then benefit, 
because the sense of community they already enjoy would 
become more defined to other segments of the world order.
Third, a system of accreditation maintained by the INGO 
community itself would give the community a measure of
This thesis does not wish to propose criteria which the 
INGO community should adopt for an accreditation system. 
Indeed, it is an important message of the thesis that 
this determination should be done by the INGO community 
itself. However, among the organizational attributes 
which might be considered are: service delivery, 
governance, management practice, finances, etc...
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control over the boundaries of its own membership. With 
any formal authority conferring status, INGOs would claim 
ownership over their own identity.
Fourth, the INGO community would benefit from having an 
accreditation process because it would give them a 
stronger legal personality in the world order. Other 
segments would know the limits of accountability for 
INGOs, and could count on INGOs to be more responsible 
for their policy calls. As a result INGOs would be more 
of a known quantity in global affairs.
Before addressing each of these claims, the next section 
reviews the concepts underlying the term 'accreditation', 
and shows why the processes used by international 
organizations for registering INGOs should not be 
considered accreditation, even when they are termed such.
Accreditation in the Private Segment
Accreditation is a process that is frequently applied to 
organizations in the private, or market segment of the 
world order. A brief look at the evolution of the term 
shows that it went from a product quality concept to a 
focus on standardization of management processes. While 
the earlier process may have been irrelevant to 
organizations in global civil society, the latter, it is 
argued, is extremely relevant.
The term 'accreditation' is not new; it is well 
entrenched in the English language. It is defined as
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gaining belief or influence for, attributing a thing to a 
person, or crediting a person with a thing, or having 
guaranteed quality^”®. Particularly in the 1950s, this 
notion of guaranteeing quality came to be associated with 
accreditation. This came as a result of the industrial 
emphasis in the 1950s, on the development of the 
discipline of Total Quality Management (TQM).
The focus of early efforts at TQM was on the predictable 
development of high quality products. W. Edwards Deming, 
the acknowledged pioneer of the discipline, saw quality 
as a "predictable degree of uniformity and 
dependability". Philip Crosby, another pioneer in the 
field, refined the concept of quality to "conformance to 
requirements, not 'goodness ' . He saw no degrees of
quality; Crosby's notion of quality was that it is an 
attribute of a thing or process, which is "determined by 
comparison with agreed and fully understood 
requirements.
This latter concept is important for taking the concept 
from the private to the public segment of the world 
order. Accreditation involves the comparison of existing
100 1989. The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Oxford University
Press. Toronto,Canada. p i 1.
Ross, Joel E. 1999. Total Quality Management: Text, 
Cases and Readings. CRC Press LLC. Boca Raton, USA. p. 
5 .
Ibid. p. 8.
Crosby, Phillip. 197 9. Quality is Free. McGraw-Hill. 
New York, USA.
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criteria to agreed-upon standards of quality. The 
measured attribute should fall within a determined set of 
standards in order to be considered of 'quality'.
In the 1990s and into the 21^  ^century, the emphasis for 
accreditation in the private segment of the world order 
has moved to TQM in administration, management and work 
processes. An accreditation process compares many 
attributes against agreed-upon standards. Accreditation 
is issued once it has been shown that standards have been 
met. This process of comparing all attributes is known 
as checking for 'conformity a s s e s s m e n t G r o u p s  like 
the International Accreditation Forum (lAF) exist to 
ensure that conformity assessments can be made by groups 
that are both qualified to perform the assessments, and 
are not in conflict of interest.
A process of professional accreditation would be 
different from the processes with which INGOs are 
currently familiar. The process called "accreditation", 
by the UN and other bodies, involves the tabulation and 
submission of information like the following:
■ Organization Name
■ Address, Phone, Fax, Email
■ Contact Name
■ Year of establishment
■ Description of Membership
■ Purpose of Organization
104 'What is the lAF?", International Accreditation Forum.
2001. Website: http ://www.iaf.nu/
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Programmes and Activities 
Membership of the Governing Body 
Financial Statements^°^
It is the goal of this system to enumerate information 
about INGOs for a conference. Using this as a substitute 
for proper accreditation means that no conformity 
assessments are done (as indeed, there are no standards 
against which to judge). It does not provide a means for 
determining much about the identity of the INGO, which is 
to say, the quality it exhibits when comparing it with 
standards for conformity assessment.
Conformity assessment standards which are determined by 
outside bodies (as well as the UN process described 
above), are based on the values of the accrediting body. 
The next section of this chapter reviews the four methods 
by which standards can be set, and shows that the INGO 
community should adopt a second party accreditation 
system.
Current Accreditation for INGOs
There are several processes of accreditation available to 
INGOs in the world today, but each is limited to a
United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. 1996. 
"Participation of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
in the Conference and the Meetings of its Preparatory 
Committee: Application for Accreditation". United 
Nations Habitat II Documentation. Nairobi, Kenya.
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specific constituency. Clearly, if one of these were not 
so limited, a global accreditation system would already 
have been established. A brief summary of these systems 
follows, along with the criticisms which prevent the 
system from being adopted globally.
In terms of subject area, the processes used by 
Interaction and by INTRAC have been mentioned already. 
Interaction has a very keen accreditation process, but is 
focused on United States-based INGOs. Similarly, the 
Canadian Council for International Cooperation focuses on 
Canadian INGOs, but has a keen set of standards.
At the international level, several voluntary 
accreditation boards have been formed. These included 
the Accrediting Bureau for Charities, in London, UK, and 
the International Committee on Fund-Raising Organizations 
in Brussels^®®. Both organizations focus on information 
dissemination and codes of conduct, and do not have broad 
acceptance or membership.
The main distinction between these organizations and the 
accreditation proposed by this thesis is that the goal of 
each existing accreditation process revolves around 
ensuring the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes 
of a particular state government. This only addresses 
one small part of the world order which could affected by
Chamberlain, Randall. 2002. Regulating Civil Society: 
The Philippine Council for NGO Certification. Philippine 
Council for NGO Certification. See Website: 
http://www.pcnc.com.ph/pcnc/CivilSoc.PDF
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an accreditation scheme. Indeed, each of these schemes 
is hampered by a lack of importance that is placed on the 
question of "whom" the accreditation system is serving. 
Should INGOs be accredited to please the state, the 
public, the private interests, or others? This question 
is best answered by breaking the types of accreditation 
into four distinct types, as is shown next.
Gerreffi's Typology of Accreditation
A common categorization system for accreditation is based 
on the identity of the body determining standards.
Gary Gerreffi offers the most detailed current analysis 
of accreditation systems aimed at organizations within 
the world order. Gerreffi categorizes accreditation 
systems by whether they are created by the organization 
being accredited (first party), professional associations 
(second party), external auditing groups (third party) or 
state government (fourth party). Simply put, it is shown 
that the second party process is the only one that would 
be of value to the INGO community.
First party accreditation refers to systems developed and 
administered by the entity being accredited. It is "the 
most common variety, whereby a firm develops its own 
rules, and reports on compliance"^^. The credibility of
Gerreffi, Gary. Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. Sasser, Erika. 
2001. "The INGO-Industrial Complex". Foreign Policy, 
(Jul-Aug). Website:
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the process is mostly internal, as the standards used in 
developing the accreditation process can easily be 
adapted to match the strengths of the body being 
accredited. In this way, first party accreditation is a 
way of organizations casting a self-fulfilling prophecy 
of legitimacy and quality.
If each INGO were to develop its own accreditation 
system, there would be relatively few benefits derived 
for the INGO community as a whole, or for the individual 
INGOs. First, any enhanced legitimacy would only be 
internal. Second, there would be no improvement in the 
sense of INGO community, as the boundaries of the 
accreditation would be a single INGO. Third, there would 
be no greater awareness of the community of INGOs, as the 
community of INGOs would not be the focus. Fourth, there 
is no connection between the development of innumerable 
different internal standards, and the establishment of a 
legal personality for the group.
By contrast, second party accreditation relies on the 
creation of professional organizations to act as 
certification bodies. Indeed, this type of accreditation 
"involves an industry or trade association fashioning a 
code of conduct and implementing reporting mechanisms"^®®.
http: //www. foreignpolicy. com/issue_julyaug__2001/geref fi . 
html
Ibid.
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The major benefit of second party accreditation is that 
it leverages the association's technical knowledge of a 
subject area into a credible set of standards. By 
applying those standards rigorously through conformity 
assessments, the organizations so accredited implicitly 
accept the value of the accreditation system.
First, the legitimacy of the community is enhanced, 
because members can show the standards by which 
membership in the community is decided. Second, the 
boundaries of identity are clarified, and the ability to 
change those boundaries is put in the hands of the 
community. Third, the awareness of members of the 
community to others segments of the world is enhanced, 
because awareness of the community as a whole is 
enhanced. Fourth, the basis for a legal personality is 
established, because there is an institutionalization of 
the concept of the INGO.
Third party accreditation is performed by an external 
expert. Ironically, in current world order, third party 
accreditation often takes the form of an INGO assessing a 
private (market segment) organization. "Third party 
certification involves an external group, often an INGO, 
imposing its rules and compliance methods onto a 
particular firm or i ndustry".
Gerreffi, Gary. Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. Sasser, Erika. 
2001. "The INGO-Industrial Complex". Foreign Policy,
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INGOs sometimes serve as the professional and technically 
proficient external bodies, which can offer accreditation 
to industry. This is not to say that all INGOs have the 
technical capacity to create standards. Rather, it is 
only to note that INGOs may, under specific political and 
time-bound conditions, be the only organization with the 
skill, desire or position to perform such tasks.
Third party accreditation is inappropriate as a system 
for accrediting organizations as INGOs. First, the 
legitimacy of the standards developed would depend on the 
legitimacy of the professional external body developing 
and testing the accreditation. Second, the identity of 
the INGO community would be determined outside of the 
control of the INGO community. While this might build 
awareness of the strength of the community, the 
flexibility of the standards over time, as different 
experts determined different standards, would hinder the 
establishment of a legal personality, rather than help.
The most important premise underlying fourth party 
accreditation is the acceptance of the authority of some 
member of the state segment. "Fourth party certification 
involves government or multilateral a g e n c i e s .
(Jul-Aug). Website:
http ://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2001/gereffi. 
html
Gerreffi, Gary. Garcia-Johnson, Ronie. Sasser, Erika. 
2001. "The INGO-Industrial Complex". Foreign Policy,
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For example, many TNCs accept the United Nations as an 
authority on environmental, labour, and human rights 
principles. In some work with the UN, for example, TNCs 
submit updates of their progress to the United Nations, 
which detail the work the TNG has done to conform to 
standards determined by the United Nations itself^^^.
A fourth party accreditation system for the INGO 
community would echo the current status quo. In short, 
there would be little change from the existing lack of 
standards. As has been shown, the reasoning behind the 
development of the United Nations INGO 'accreditation 
system' is biased, and does not address even basic issues 
of professionalism in management and administration.
Pursuing a second-party accreditation system would be 
difficult for the INGO community. Yet it is worthwhile. 
As explained in the next sections, such an association 
and process would enhance the INGO community's 
legitimacy, community, identity and legal personality.
Accreditation Enhances Legitimacy
The main purpose of accreditation is to establish that an 
organization or individual meets accepted standards of 
competence in their activities. Generally, though, the
(Jul-Aug). Website:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2001/gereffi. 
html
Ibid.
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benefits of accreditation can be summarized into two 
categories: internal quality assurance, and thus, 
external perception of higher quality^^^. Indeed, this 
latter benefit, of opening doors to otherwise closed 
business is cited^^^ as the strongest benefit business 
firms derive from undergoing the process of 
accreditation.
The implementation of an accreditation system ensures 
greater internal accountability for any organization. In 
the public segment, for individual INGOs, a monitored 
measure of accreditation would force a more Inglehartian 
approach to involvement. One great hindrance to the 
legitimacy of the INGO community has been that many of 
its members have not rigorously ensured an internally 
accountable system of representation.
Internally, the maintenance of membership of individual 
INGOs is suspect, because of the passive role they play 
in determining the goals and mission of the INGO. The 
membership of an INGO is frequently assumed to be that of 
passive members, seeking an involvement that does not 
require more than paying annual membership rates^^^. In
Gavin, P.M. Dick. 2000. "ISO 9000 certification 
benefits: reality or myth?". The TQM Magazine. Vol. 12 
Issue 6. p. 366.
Ibid. p. 369.
Spiro, Peter. 2002. "Accounting for INGOs". Chicago 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 3. No. 1. Spring, 
2U02. p. 163.
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such a milieu, it is unlikely that the complete 
organizational agenda will be reviewed. On top of this, 
INGO leaders are given a great deal of power within their 
organization :
NGO executive directorates have membership and 
other funds at their disposal, with few strings 
attached, and can claim to speak for thousands, 
sometimes millions of members who as a practical 
matter exercise little scrutiny of their 
representatives'^^.
In areas perceived to be shortcomings, a second party 
accreditation system could require a more Inglehartian 
approach to community, if the concerns of members outside 
the INGO community were truly vital to the functioning of 
the INGO community.
Instituting a system of agreed-upon standards for 
internal accountability and management would thus address 
one of the major perceived shortcomings of the governance 
of members of the INGO community.
It would undesirable for the INGO community to use the UN 
to determine or monitor such an accreditation system, 
because the UN is itself an interested party. The 
legitimacy of systems of accreditation governed by the UN 
would be more suspect, and thus less credible, than one 
governed by the INGO community itself.
Ibid.
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Accreditation Enhances ^Community'
A second internal benefit deriving from the 
implementation of INGO accreditation would be the 
improved sense of community. By engaging in the act of 
developing agreed-upon standards for membership, INGOs 
would better know what it means to be an INGO.
The very debate over standards for accreditation within a 
group is healthy. It is the only means of assuring that a 
community is fully aware and in control of its nature. 
Further, such discussions stimulate formal research, and 
provide the only means for a field to achieve 
professional status^^®.
The concept of community among organizations is distinct 
from that among individuals. To achieve a sense of 
community among organizations, there must first be 
consistency among the organizations themselves. By 
metaphor, it would be difficult to establish a sense of 
community in a transient area, or among people with 
multiple-personality disorder. The consistency assured 
by accreditation provides the foundation of consistency 
from which a formal sense of community can be 
established.
Ray, Charles M. McCoy, Ranyd. 2000. "Why certification 
in information systems?" Information Technology, 
Learning, and Performance Journal. Spring.
Organizational Research Association, pp. 1-3.
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Accreditation Brings Ownership of Identity
Accreditation gives the accrediting body the power to 
determine what is 'inside' and 'outside'. This allows 
the accrediting body to determine identity.
The INGO community has been concerned with its identity 
for some time. As INGO profile has increased, the lack 
of common rules of conduct and professional management 
has become more glaring. In some cases, this has led to 
the destruction of hard-won legitimacy, when INGOs were 
associated with offensive and sanctioned behaviour. The 
alleged cases of child abuse in West Africa demonstrate 
the importance of INGOs knowing which groups are inside 
and outside of the community of INGOs. In that case, it 
was determined not to be an INGO failing, but this could 
be determined by contrast to the state representatives 
who were inflicting the abuse^^^. In cases of an 
organization assuming the manner of an INGO, it would 
have been extremely difficult for the INGO community to 
distance itself from the behaviour.
When the INGO community cannot control the identity of 
its own membership in any consistent, agreed-upon manner, 
the existence of that community is threatened. Where 
INGOs, through malice or negligence, have allowed their 
representatives to sully the reputation of the entire
"Major INGO Groups Moves to Protect Children From 
Abuse". Reuters. 3/4/2 002.
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community by association, the whole community loses 
credibility.
On a higher level, the lack of consistency offers 
opportunities for authors hostile to the INGO community 
to group them with undesirable elements. For example, 
Moises Naim has casually noted that the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network is an INGO^^®. Without an identity 
governed by the INGO community itself, it is hard to 
refute his claim.
Accreditation Provides Foundation for Legal Personality
The state, TNCs and the international bureaucrats would 
benefit from efforts of the INGO community to institute a 
system of accreditation. Such a system would address the 
main problem with the current standards-free definition 
of the INGO: if they wielded power in international 
decision-making relative to their credibility among some 
sectors of the public, INGOs could be an enormously 
destabilizing force in the world order.
INGOs can use the current world order to advance their 
own agendas, without having accountability for their 
influence or for the results of agreements they help 
broker. Though INGOs like the World Wildlife Federation 
and the International Olympic Committee hold enormous 
power in specific situations, their participation in
Naim, Moises. 2002. "Al Qaeda, the INGO." Foreign 
Policy. Iss. 129. p. 100.
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international dialogue is neither institutionalized, nor 
legally recognized. Formal participation is, in fact, 
prohibited because INGOs have no legal personality^^.
Since there is no legal personality, and INGOs are 
informal players, they are only bound to the business 
rules of the world order insofar as it affects their 
legitimacy in the eyes of other player. For instance, if 
INGOs only like certain parts of environmental 
agreements, they can reject the other sections, and only 
support particular portions. In short, without a legal 
personality, INGOs do not have the rights, nor the 
responsibilities of other international actors^^°.
In the past, this issue meant that global civil society 
in general has been simply shut out of the dealings of 
the world order. In a practical sense, however, INGOs 
now exercise many of the powers they would wield if such 
"rights" were accorded to them. They currently lack, 
however, the associated "responsibilities" that would 
come with the formal enactment of legal personality. The 
accreditation process would be a very valuable foundation 
for the development of an international legal personality 
for INGOs.
Spiro, Peter. 2002. "Accounting for INGOs". Chicago 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 3. No. 1. Spring, 
2U02. p. 168.
Ibid. p. 169.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown where the concepts behind 
accreditation come from, and has shown why a second party 
system of accreditation is the most appropriate type for 
INGOs.
Further, it is clear that there are many theoretical 
benefits which the INGO community would derive from the 
implementation of such a system. Among these are; 
enhancement to legitimacy, community, identity, and the 
establishment of a foundation for creating a legal 
personality.
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Chapter 5 : Conclusions and Findings
The goal of the discipline of International Studies is to 
create ever better understandings of the world of global 
affairs. To do so, theories are created and constantly 
tested. These comprehensive set of expectations and 
beliefs always have a raison d'être. In abstracting 
reality, each theory simplify a particular area of 
interest. For example, neorealism focuses only on the 
relative power of states, Marxism highlights social 
issues (in particular those related to economics and 
class), and feminist theory examines gender issues.
Over time, issues rise or decrease in importance, social 
factors change, and so dominant theories must be 
challenged. The must be tested and retested, not only to 
show their robustness, but to show their relevance.
This thesis shows one such challenge to existing dominant 
theory, in particular neorealism. In not accounting for 
the INGO, or accounting for it in terms of the state, 
neorealism cannot adequately explain a force in global 
affairs which is having increasing impact on the global 
stage.
This thesis has been important because the acceptance of 
the need for the INGO community to develop a system of 
second party accreditation implies the acceptance that 
INGOs can develop a legal personality on their own terms. 
Further, an identity so created institutionalizes the 
legitimacy, and thus the authority and power of the INGO
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community as a whole. This self-realized identity has no 
place in the neorealist lens, and thus poses a 
significant challenge to the dominant theory in use in 
international relations today.
The main challenges to legitimacy of the INGO community 
lie in the challenges to INGOs themselves, as related in 
chapter two. A system of second party accreditation, as 
explained in chapter four, would address each of the five 
criticisms, as shown below.
Second Party Accreditation and INGO Criticisms
The main criticisms of INGOs revolve around a perceived 
lack of accountability. INGOs are criticized as being 
unaccountable to the state in that they are said to be 
able to renege on agreements. They are called 
unaccountable to civil society by misrepresenting the 
public in political work, or disenfranchising the public 
in service work. These three accountability criticisms 
are addressed in turn.
First, INGOs are criticized by state representatives as 
irrelevant for not having the legal personality to be 
bound to agreements. This is an argument which truly 
begs the question. To reword the criticism, viewing 
INGOs through a lens which renders them legal non­
entities, INGOs are not seen as able to be legal 
entities.
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In the case where INGOs had the foundation upon which to 
build a legal personality, they would have a basis for 
recognition, acceptance, and thus accountability. The 
second party accreditation system would provide such a 
basis.
Second, if, as criticized, INGOs are a vocal minority 
imposing their will on the majority, then a system of 
second party accreditation would serve as a check on the 
power of that INGO. This criticism suggests that INGOs 
have a great deal of power, which can be wielded not only 
in the absence of known public preference, but in spite 
of it. As has been explained, INGOs derive any 
conditioning power they enjoy from a legitimacy bestowed 
by the public.
Assuming, however, that INGOs had such a power, the case 
for second party accreditation would be strengthened, 
from the perspective of any segment. An accrediting body 
would serve as a check on the influence of any single 
INGO, and would be desirable from the perspective of 
state, market and civil society.
Does the service work of INGOs disenfranchise citizens? 
Assuming for a moment that INGO work does, it would again 
be in the interest of the public to push for second party 
accreditation. They system would serve as an optional 
path for seeking remedies from INGOs in the absence of 
any other mediating group.
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INGOs are also criticized for undermining sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is a concept that seems critical to states 
because is enshrines the existence and rights of states. 
INGOs at times may indeed challenge the very concept of 
sovereignty. A second party accreditation system would 
serve as a means to moderate and focus these challenges.
Second party accreditation thus addresses the major 
criticisms of INGOs, and helps moderate the perceived 
excesses. In the least, such an accrediting body would 
provide a self-governing means of accountability for the 
public and the state to question the INGO community.
This chapter concludes the thesis by reviewing the 
benefits of accreditation in terms of identity, 
community, legitimacy, and legal personality. The 
chapter closes by looking at potential obstacles to 
accreditation for INGOs, and looks forward to further 
research which could be done on the topic.
Theoretical Benefits of Accreditation
The benefits of accreditation reviewed in chapter four 
could be achieved among members of the INGO community. 
This section reviews the definitions developed for this 
thesis, and show the benefits of identity, community, 
legitimacy, and legal personality.
INGOs are distinct from state and private enterprise. 
While all three segments of the world order may overlap 
in the means by which they attain their goals, each is
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unique enough that global civil society can be clearly 
distinguished from private enterprise, and both can be 
seen to be clearly different from the state segment. 
Organizations fit into the state segment if they have 
overriding authority which is recognized by their 
constituents.
Organizations without this authority are considered non­
state actors, of which there are organizations with 
private (market segment) and those with public (global 
civil society segment) goals.
Within global civil society, there is the disorganized 
public and the organized public. The organized public is 
the INGO community. By virtue of this segment having no 
other organized agents to represent it, the INGO 
community frequently falls into the role of being an 
agent working on behalf of global civil society.
Unfortunately, the community of INGOs is an anarchic, 
anomalous mass of organizations which frequently changes. 
Further, this mass has no globally accepted set of 
standards for membership. As such, global civil society 
as represented by INGOs has inconsistent approaches, 
responses, identity and personality.
In practice, INGOs take on roles ranging from agenda- 
setting, enacting global policy, or auditing policy 
implementations. These roles vary from issue to issue, 
INGO to INGO, and time to time. Certain specific INGOs
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may maintain a consistent, credible role in any of those 
three processes, but the community as a whole cannot be 
said to be so consistent.
The group of INGOs is an identifiable community, but 
there are no standards which define what groups are 
inside and outside of that community. Accreditation 
would provide this definition, and second party 
accreditation would allow INGOs to determine those 
boundaries themselves. An enhanced sense of community, 
as discussed in chapter four, allows for greater 
credibility, legitimacy. For the INGO community, this 
would mean the latent potential to create a legal 
personality in the world order.
The process of accreditation evolved in the private 
segment of the world order, but has matured to a point 
where it would be a useful process to ensure consistency 
among and between organizations in the public segment.
Practical Obstacles to Accreditation
Practically speaking, the major problem to developing an 
accreditation system for INGOs is the lack of any current 
association which could provide the technical expertise 
to develop and enforce standards, and would have 
credibility among the members of the INGO community.
within the INGO community, two INGOs developed first 
party accreditation systems. By setting up these rules 
for their members, groups like the INGO Training and 
Research Centre (INTRAC), and Interaction sought to 
establish a sense of added legitimacy among their 
members. Where INTRAC operates as a non-profit 
consulting agency. Interaction is a federation of US- 
based humanitarian INGOs.
INTRAC focuses on a business approach to improving INGO 
methods, impact and management capacity. Though not an 
accrediting body per se, INTRAC offers services to other 
INGOs to improve their professionalism.
By contrast. Interaction is a humanitarian aid-focused 
membership organization for US-based INGOs. Its strength 
is in the meticulous set of standards developed for 
membership in organization. Though not billed as a 
certification system, its 'PVO standards' are 
comprehensive^^, and relate to both the professionalism 
of the organization, and the ethical standards by which 
its member INGOs carry out their activities.
Indeed, the single, largest obstacle to the professional 
second party accreditation of INGOs would lie in the 
ability of the INGO community to organize itself into a
McClymont, Mary. Interaction. 2001. Interaction 
Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Standards, Website : 
http ://www.interaction.org/pvostandards/mission.html
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stable, institutionalized organization which could police 
itself.
This problem has been surmounted by other professional 
associations, such as doctors, engineers and others. 
Doctors have developed a meticulous, widely credible 
system of accreditation. While implementations of the 
medical profession's accreditation system vary from 
region to region, they all stringently guarantee 
adherence to a fixed set of standards.
More importantly, however, the legitimacy that medical 
professionals derive from their system of accreditation 
allows them to become the instruments of power by which 
the state enacts subject-specific legislation. In short, 
doctors in the medical establishment, short of any 
egregious shortcoming, are generally governed by 
regulations determined by one or another professional 
association of doctors.
More importantly, the power of the medical establishment 
in society is so conditioned, that many governments have 
accepted legal codes which puts the discretion of the 
medical professional (for issues like privacy and public 
safety) over the condign or compensatory power of the 
governing body.
As mentioned before, there is no formal existing 
association of INGOs which represents the entire scope of 
the INGO community. While private groups of INGOs (e.g.
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INTRAC, Interaction) do exist, and wide INGO membership 
can be found in international organizations, neither of 
these groups represents the full spectrum of the INGO 
community.
Second, since the nature of INGOs is to be subject- 
specific, the development of any broad system of 
accreditation might be impossible to achieve. Any given 
solution might be deemed to have inappropriate emphasis 
by sub-groups of the INGO community. Indeed, it would be 
a challenge to develop a broad set of principles and 
rules for the entire community which did NOT have 
inappropriate emphasis when applied to individual members 
of the INGO community. Any such set of rules could be 
argued to benefit one individual or group more than 
another.
The community of INGOs changes frequently. As they cannot 
have a profit motive, they are inherently vulnerable to 
budget constraints. When money is unavailable, INGOs can 
simply disappear. Moreover, INGOs reflect the current 
concerns of global civil society. As the concerns 
change, different INGOs will form and disband.
Finally, the biggest obstacle to developing such a system 
of accreditation would be the cost of creating the 
system. Members of the INGO community are, by their 
nature, not connected to reliable revenue flows for 
organizational development. The institutional costs of 
developing and maintaining an effective system of
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accreditation, plus monitoring and policing such a 
system, might be very high.
Conclusion
The theoretical benefits of accreditation for the INGO 
community are large, and meet the goals inherent in 
INGOs. In summary, an accreditation system would allow 
INGOs to be better able to meet their goals, and to 
operate in a consistent environment. This would also be 
desirable for other segments of the world order, and for 
global civil society in general.
The state and market would have a more reliable, 
accountable counterpart in an INGO community. An 
accredited INGO community, with a legal personality, 
would become a predictable part of the development of 
global policy.
The public would have a known quantity as an avenue for 
accountability. In the event that an INGO transgressed 
boundaries of accreditation, the larger community would 
have power to ostracize the INGO, thus reducing its 
capacity from legitimate power to tactical influence.
The INGO community itself would have control over the 
boundaries of membership, and could take a more 
institutionalized power role in the world order. The 
extent to which such a body was welcomed by states would
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be concomitant with the legitimacy which the 
accreditation process built; in other words, if an 
effective, credible accreditation process was widely 
adopted, the INGO community would be more likely to be 
recognized than it is currently.
There are many practical obstacles to establishing a 
second party accreditation process for INGOs. Still, the 
benefits which accreditation brings make it worthwhile to 
address energy to surmounting those obstacles.
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